The bigger question people and the FAA should be thinking about is whether the Newark situation is unique, given the extended path from the EWR source radars to the LI facility they used to and still go to and then the transfer of the data from LI to Philly (and I'm guessing it's all raw data until received and processed in Philly) or if it could become more common given the aging radars and infrastructure throughout the US aviation system.
As per the link, there was a 6-minute outage at JFK in 2018, but I don't recall hearing anything about that one, plus the FAA only gave an outage a medium overall risk for the analysis of the move from LI to Philly for EWR radar data and ATC oversight in Philly - to me that sounds low for a risk that should consist of the combination of the probability of the failure (which they estimated to be 1 in 11,000,000, which sounds too remote to me) times the potential impact of that failure if it occurs (which is humongous).
I've done a lot of these kinds of risk analyses in the chemical industry and my gut tells me that the Newark situation is just the tip of the iceberg and we're going to see more of these kinds of failures in more locations (just based on the fact that supposedly the infrastructure is old nearly everywhere and not unique to EWR), which is not good. As I said in my first post in this thread, this is a bipartisan problem 40+ years in the making and needs to be treated as a safety emergency for US aviation, in general. I'll be driving to Florida in June.
https://www.cnn.com/2025/05/09/us/newark-delays-air-traffic-control-safety-invs#:~:text=To%20determine%20the%20likelihood%20of,of%20the%202022%20report's%20conclusions.