SCOTUS Term 25-26

[FLaw47]

Sounds like the government is getting the crap kicked out of it in this birthright citizenship case

IMO, the government's position is preposterous. And if you're fine overturning that, I don't know why a future (hypothetical and unlikely) liberal SCOTUS wouldn't just feel empowered to "fix" gerrymandering, abortion, wedding cakes, and everything else. Precedent either counts or it doesn't.

 

[FLaw47]

@Aardvark86, why did SCOTUS even decide to hear this case? Just to put it to bed?

 

[BigPapaWhit]

Bumping before it gets buried on page three.

 

[Rastafarian]

Curious about this:



why would the Supreme Court vacate this? He was already found guilty by jury.

 

[DailyBuck7]

Curious about this:



why would the Supreme Court vacate this? He was already found guilty by jury.

Because the lower court applied the wrong legal standard and instructed the jury incorrectly.

 

[Aardvark86]

So, belatedly…happy Easter

I finally listened to the oral arguments in the birthright citizenship case on my drive up to dc this morning. A few observations.

1. It was a good argument and all of the justices were exceptionally well behaved, perhaps given the seriousness of the matter. It was also good in that it not only included questions as to the basic theory, but also a ton of interesting questions on outlier scenarios at the periphery.
2. Sauer actually did a very good job presenting the government's “subject to the jurisdiction” argument. I actually do think the theory hangs together well, and if it were 1900 or so, I’d think his chances much better.
3. I don’t profess to be nimble with either the leg history (there's a lot, and it's not all cutting one way) or wong Kim ark (a long a somewhat archaic style makes it tough to penetrate), but I have a sneaky suspicion the court is going to restrict wka to its facts (where there was no dispute that Mr ark had established us domicile). TBC, I don't think that necessarily means the G wins here.
4. IMO, the weak part of the g’s theory is that it seems to stitch together loosely a whole bunch of outlier data and interpretive points. Not as coherent as they try to suggest. CJR sort of started with this.
5. The justices did indeed push sauer harder than ms wang but I don’t think it was as hard as some press reports suggest. That said, everybody was pressure testing sauer including some tough practical implications questions, and I doubt he will prevail.
6. Best and most interesting questions; a) kagan pushing him on what standard would have to be met to overcome the historical understanding/consensus of how birthright has been accepted as a practical matter (sauer argued that the history is not as consistent as she suggested, noting some lore from an fdr dos official who didnt think wka provided for birthright); b) kav (and to a lesser degree Barrett) pressing on whether Congress can by legislation interpret “subject to the jurisdiction” (both advocates said yes, but Wang said it’s only a one way door that allows broadening citizenship, which doesn’t smell quite right); and c) Gorsuch and Barrett asking whether aside from the statute and solely based on the constitution Indians born in the us are citizens (sauer said yes, wang no/only by statute, interestingly).

Again, at the end of the day, I still think this’ll come down to the kagan point. Wang started her argument effectively along the lines of “ask any American what they understand to be the rule”. I think that’s what carries the day.

 

[Aardvark86]

Because the lower court applied the wrong legal standard and instructed the jury incorrectly.

I’ll confess I haven’t followed the bannon saga as I just don’t care what happens to him because I think he’s an opportunistic schmuck. I’ll defer to buck as to the answer, but it is my understanding that the result here is similar to another case.

 

[Aardvark86]

@Aardvark86, why did SCOTUS even decide to hear this case? Just to put it to bed?

I think that’s a bIg part of it - big enough that they could see they would eventually have to, and maybe now before the eo gets applied in some specific deportation context where someone’s on a plane to Cuba, or being blocked at the ballot box

 

[DailyBuck7]

I’ll confess I haven’t followed the bannon saga as I just don’t care what happens to him because I think he’s an opportunistic schmuck. I’ll defer to buck as to the answer, but it is my understanding that the result here is similar to another case.

I was going by an NBC summary of the case. It was a little more subtle than I thought. The Supreme Court granted certiorari vacated the judgment and remanded case to district court to consider the DOJ's motion to dismiss the indictment. https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/040626zor_5iek.pdf? Don't know if this right, but here is how Chatgpt summarized it:

"The Court did not directly “overturn” the conviction on the merits. Instead, it used a common procedural move (often called a GVR order — grant, vacate, remand) to clear the way for the lower courts to reconsider the case given the government’s request to dismiss it." Not my area of the law, but it looks like the Court of Appeals decision no longer stands.

No big fan of Bannon. On the other hand the FBI agents and bosses who authorized the perp walk for Peter Navarro should have been severely punished for acting like common thugs.

 

[Aardvark86]

Looking ahead to next week's final argument session of the term, there are some really big, if not the sexiest, arguments on the schedule.

1. FCC v ATT - whether a telecom company has a right to a jury trial under the sixth amendment in an FCC action for monetary forfeitures. This is expanding on a case from a couple of years ago broadly interpreting the sixth amendment,
2. Chatie - Whether geofence warrants are permissible under the 4th amendment. (Geofence warrants are requests to telecom companies to search and identify the phones of everyone within, say, a geographic area adjacent to a crime.
3. Mullin- whether the administration can eliminate temporary protected status for syrian immigrants
4. Hikma - "skinny labels" - whether a generic drug company can evade patent liability if its product's label only discusses those approved uses of the corresponding brand that are no longer subject to patent protection
5. Monsanto - whether failure to warn claims for roundup are preempted if the epa didn't require the warning

No announcements yet regarding when we might get the next batch of opinions.

 

[fatpiggy]

Looking ahead to next week's final argument session of the term, there are some really big, if not the sexiest, arguments on the schedule.

1. FCC v ATT - whether a telecom company has a right to a jury trial under the sixth amendment in an FCC action for monetary forfeitures. This is expanding on a case from a couple of years ago broadly interpreting the sixth amendment,
2. Chatie - Whether geofence warrants are permissible under the 4th amendment. (Geofence warrants are requests to telecom companies to search and identify the phones of everyone within, say, a geographic area adjacent to a crime.
3. Mullin- whether the administration can eliminate temporary protected status for syrian immigrants
4. Hikma - "skinny labels" - whether a generic drug company can evade patent liability if its product's label only discusses those approved uses of the corresponding brand that are no longer subject to patent protection
5. Monsanto - whether failure to warn claims for roundup are preempted if the epa didn't require the warning

No announcements yet regarding when we might get the next batch of opinions.

#2 Is interesting. I would side with the "searches" being legal. Sounds like many legal scholars don't even think it is a search to begin with, and i kind of feel like that's where i stand.

A more interesting question to me would be if the geofence was around someone's house and they tracked the individual's movement on their own property. I wonder if that would change things at all, as opposed tp the offender being in public?

In my opinion, once you go out in public such as in this case, you kind of lose your expectations of privacy.

Searching your phone and it's contents = violation.
Searching the meta data about your phones location in public =/ no violation.

Spoiler

Sure, I'd be happy to talk about this—it's a fascinating (and timely) case at the intersection of privacy, technology, and the Fourth Amendment. You probably meant Chatrie v. United States (Okello T. Chatrie is the petitioner; the name is often stylized as United States v. Chatrie in lower courts). It's the first Supreme Court case directly addressing geofence warrants, which are exactly what you described: court orders compelling companies like Google to search their location databases and identify every phone that was in a defined geographic area (the "geofence") during a specific time window around a crime.

scotusblog.com
Quick Background on the CaseIn May 2019, someone robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. Police had no immediate suspects or surveillance footage that helped much, so they applied for a geofence warrant from Google (the dominant provider of this data at the time). The warrant covered a 150-meter radius (about 300 meters across, or roughly three football fields) centered on the bank for a one-hour window (30 minutes before and after the robbery). That area included the bank, a nearby church, apartments, and other private spaces.

ca4.uscourts.gov
Google's Location History data (which users had to opt into) uses GPS, Wi-Fi, and cell signals to track devices with high precision. The warrant triggered Google's three-step process:

1. Step 1: Google returns an anonymized list of all devices in the geofence during that hour (in this case, about 19 devices).
2. Step 2: Police narrow it down by requesting more precise location data outside the initial window to eliminate innocent bystanders.
3. Step 3: For the remaining devices relevant to the investigation, Google reveals account-identifying info (name, email, etc.).

One of those devices belonged to Okello Chatrie. Police used that (plus other evidence) to arrest and convict him of armed robbery. He moved to suppress the geofence evidence, arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment.

brookings.edu
Here's what a real geofence warrant looked like in a similar case (this one matches the scale and urban setting from Chatrie's):
warrantbuilder.com
And a simpler illustration of how geofencing works conceptually (pinning all devices in an area):
nlsblog.org
The Fourth Amendment IssuesThe core question is whether this kind of warrant is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires warrants to be supported by probable cause and describe with particularity "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."Key debates:

• Is it even a "search"? Under Carpenter v. United States (2018), police generally need a warrant for historical cell-site location information (CSLI) because it reveals intimate details of a person's movements and invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. Privacy advocates say geofence data is even more invasive—it's a "reverse search" or dragnet that sweeps up everyone in an area, not just a suspect. Critics (including the ACLU, Brennan Center, and others in amicus briefs) call it a modern general warrant—the kind the Founders hated, where officers could rummage through innocents' data without individualized suspicion.
  
  aclu.org
• Particularity and probable cause? The district court agreed with Chatrie that the warrant failed these requirements. Police didn't have probable cause for every person whose phone might be in the geofence (most were innocent). The multi-step process gave too much discretion to police and Google after the initial warrant. It's like authorizing a search of every house on a block because one might have evidence.
  
  brennancenter.org
• Good faith exception? The lower courts let the evidence in anyway under United States v. Leon (1984), because officers reasonably relied on the judge-approved warrant.

The Fifth Circuit (in a different 2024 case, United States v. Smith) ruled geofence warrants are categorically unconstitutional as overbroad general warrants. The Fourth Circuit (en banc in 2025) was badly fractured—14 judges issued a one-sentence per curiam affirmance, but with nine separate opinions totaling 126 pages and a 7-7 split on whether it was even a search. Most agreed the good-faith exception saved the evidence.

ca4.uscourts.gov
Where the Supreme Court Stands (as of April 15, 2026)The Court granted certiorari in January 2026, limited to whether the execution of this geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment (they didn't take up the exclusionary rule/good faith question). Oral arguments are set for April 27, 2026—just 12 days from now. No decision yet, and briefing is ongoing.

scotusblog.com
Privacy groups (ACLU, EPIC, Knight First Amendment Institute, etc.) have filed amicus briefs urging the Court to rule these warrants unconstitutional or at least strictly limit them—they chill free speech/association by letting police map who was at protests, churches, doctors' offices, etc. Law enforcement argues they're a valuable, narrowly tailored tool for "no-lead" crimes, bounded by time and space, and already subject to judicial review.

epic.org
Note: Google changed its policies in 2023–2024 (storing Location History locally on devices and shortening retention), which has already curtailed geofence warrants significantly. But the constitutional question remains huge for future "reverse search" tech.Why This MattersA broad ruling against geofence warrants could reshape digital policing (similar to how Carpenter did for CSLI). A narrow one upholding this specific warrant (perhaps on good faith or narrow tailoring) could greenlight wider use. Either way, it's a big test of how the Fourth Amendment adapts to always-on location tracking.If the decision drops this summer (typical for spring arguments), it'll be one to watch. Want me to dive deeper into any part—the lower court opinions, amicus arguments, or comparisons to Carpenter/Jones/Kyllo? Or updates after arguments? Just say the word!

 

[Aardvark86]

#2 Is interesting. I would side with the "searches" being legal. Sounds like many legal scholars don't even think it is a search to begin with, and i kind of feel like that's where i stand.

A more interesting question to me would be if the geofence was around someone's house and they tracked the individual's movement on their own property. I wonder if that would change things at all, as opposed tp the offender being in public?

In my opinion, once you go out in public such as in this case, you kind of lose your expectations of privacy.

Searching your phone and it's contents = violation.
Searching the meta data about your phones location in public =/ no violation.

Spoiler

Sure, I'd be happy to talk about this—it's a fascinating (and timely) case at the intersection of privacy, technology, and the Fourth Amendment. You probably meant Chatrie v. United States (Okello T. Chatrie is the petitioner; the name is often stylized as United States v. Chatrie in lower courts). It's the first Supreme Court case directly addressing geofence warrants, which are exactly what you described: court orders compelling companies like Google to search their location databases and identify every phone that was in a defined geographic area (the "geofence") during a specific time window around a crime.

scotusblog.com
Quick Background on the CaseIn May 2019, someone robbed a credit union in Midlothian, Virginia. Police had no immediate suspects or surveillance footage that helped much, so they applied for a geofence warrant from Google (the dominant provider of this data at the time). The warrant covered a 150-meter radius (about 300 meters across, or roughly three football fields) centered on the bank for a one-hour window (30 minutes before and after the robbery). That area included the bank, a nearby church, apartments, and other private spaces.

ca4.uscourts.gov
Google's Location History data (which users had to opt into) uses GPS, Wi-Fi, and cell signals to track devices with high precision. The warrant triggered Google's three-step process:

1. Step 1: Google returns an anonymized list of all devices in the geofence during that hour (in this case, about 19 devices).
2. Step 2: Police narrow it down by requesting more precise location data outside the initial window to eliminate innocent bystanders.
3. Step 3: For the remaining devices relevant to the investigation, Google reveals account-identifying info (name, email, etc.).

One of those devices belonged to Okello Chatrie. Police used that (plus other evidence) to arrest and convict him of armed robbery. He moved to suppress the geofence evidence, arguing it violated the Fourth Amendment.

brookings.edu
Here's what a real geofence warrant looked like in a similar case (this one matches the scale and urban setting from Chatrie's):
warrantbuilder.com
And a simpler illustration of how geofencing works conceptually (pinning all devices in an area):
nlsblog.org
The Fourth Amendment IssuesThe core question is whether this kind of warrant is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, which protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires warrants to be supported by probable cause and describe with particularity "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."Key debates:

• Is it even a "search"? Under Carpenter v. United States (2018), police generally need a warrant for historical cell-site location information (CSLI) because it reveals intimate details of a person's movements and invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. Privacy advocates say geofence data is even more invasive—it's a "reverse search" or dragnet that sweeps up everyone in an area, not just a suspect. Critics (including the ACLU, Brennan Center, and others in amicus briefs) call it a modern general warrant—the kind the Founders hated, where officers could rummage through innocents' data without individualized suspicion.
  
  aclu.org
• Particularity and probable cause? The district court agreed with Chatrie that the warrant failed these requirements. Police didn't have probable cause for every person whose phone might be in the geofence (most were innocent). The multi-step process gave too much discretion to police and Google after the initial warrant. It's like authorizing a search of every house on a block because one might have evidence.
  
  brennancenter.org
• Good faith exception? The lower courts let the evidence in anyway under United States v. Leon (1984), because officers reasonably relied on the judge-approved warrant.

The Fifth Circuit (in a different 2024 case, United States v. Smith) ruled geofence warrants are categorically unconstitutional as overbroad general warrants. The Fourth Circuit (en banc in 2025) was badly fractured—14 judges issued a one-sentence per curiam affirmance, but with nine separate opinions totaling 126 pages and a 7-7 split on whether it was even a search. Most agreed the good-faith exception saved the evidence.

ca4.uscourts.gov
Where the Supreme Court Stands (as of April 15, 2026)The Court granted certiorari in January 2026, limited to whether the execution of this geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment (they didn't take up the exclusionary rule/good faith question). Oral arguments are set for April 27, 2026—just 12 days from now. No decision yet, and briefing is ongoing.

scotusblog.com
Privacy groups (ACLU, EPIC, Knight First Amendment Institute, etc.) have filed amicus briefs urging the Court to rule these warrants unconstitutional or at least strictly limit them—they chill free speech/association by letting police map who was at protests, churches, doctors' offices, etc. Law enforcement argues they're a valuable, narrowly tailored tool for "no-lead" crimes, bounded by time and space, and already subject to judicial review.

epic.org
Note: Google changed its policies in 2023–2024 (storing Location History locally on devices and shortening retention), which has already curtailed geofence warrants significantly. But the constitutional question remains huge for future "reverse search" tech.Why This MattersA broad ruling against geofence warrants could reshape digital policing (similar to how Carpenter did for CSLI). A narrow one upholding this specific warrant (perhaps on good faith or narrow tailoring) could greenlight wider use. Either way, it's a big test of how the Fourth Amendment adapts to always-on location tracking.If the decision drops this summer (typical for spring arguments), it'll be one to watch. Want me to dive deeper into any part—the lower court opinions, amicus arguments, or comparisons to Carpenter/Jones/Kyllo? Or updates after arguments? Just say the word!

Yeah, the geofence issue is an interesting one. It's a search since it's seeking a private party's third party data - two parties, actually: the telecom and the phone owner. Requests for location data are clearly searches subject to warrants, and executed all the time.

but as the late justice scalia once observed, there is something a little disconcerting about sacrificing what once would have been private information (our location and movements) to the advances of technology.

 

[BigPapaWhit]

Yeah, the geofence issue is an interesting one. It's a search since it's seeking a private party's third party data - two parties, actually: the telecom and the phone owner. Requests for location data are clearly searches subject to warrants, and executed all the time.

but as the late justice scalia once observed, there is something a little disconcerting about sacrificing what once would have been private information (our location and movements) to the advances of technology.

Would it be better to put up police/govt owned cameras everywhere like other countries? I think that is better than them policing our phones. But this also feels like those blanket telecom warrants that Snowden warned us about post 9/11. Unless I'm conflating different events.

 

[fatpiggy]

Would it be better to put up police/govt owned cameras everywhere like other countries? I think that is better than them policing our phones. But this also feels like those blanket telecom warrants that Snowden warned us about post 9/11. Unless I'm conflating different events.

This reminds me of a stock i trade, AXON. They essentially are the AI of police, among other things. They stitch together video feeds from the community, the officers body cameras, drones, and all kinds of other pertinent information to give the police a total picture of a scenario.