Directionally I absolutely give it credence. Most people fail to understand statistics and issues around polling methodology. The economist poll had something around a +/- 6% margin of error for the subset made up of independents at a 95% confidence level. What that means is the pollsters are 95% confident that the actual population of independents will fall somewhere in the range of a 15-27% approval rate.
Could Trump have higher support than that? Absolutely he could. Why? because sampling methodology can bias results against overall population. Maybe pro-Trump independents simply are less trusting of polls. Maybe pro-Trumpers are embarrassed to admit their support, etc. There are numerous factors. And if this was a one off poll I would not be so confident that Trump is in the toilet.
But it’s not a one-off poll. It’s actually weekly. So you can follow the trend which, over time, normalizes the biases in respondents. Here are the results (thank you Gemini) pulling a monthly sample since the inauguration. While the 21% may or may not be the actual average, my confidence that he has lost a ton of the independents that supported him on inauguration Day is VERY high.
| Month / Year | Approx. Independent Sample Size | Independent Approval | Independent Disapproval | Subsample Margin of Error | Notable Timeline Event |
| June 2026 | ~450 | 21% | 71% | $\pm$5.5% | Record low; peak inflation & Iran war strain |
| May 2026 | ~450 | 24% | 68% | $\pm$5.5% | Rising dissatisfaction with economic metrics |
| April 2026 | ~440 | 27% | 64% | $\pm$5.6% | Drop in strong supporters across demographic bands |
| March 2026 | ~450 | 29% | 62% | $\pm$5.5% | First major dips on foreign policy & inflation tracking |
| February 2026 | ~460 | 31% | 59% | $\pm$5.5% | Early shifts as initial post-election optimism cools |
| January 2026 | ~450 | 33% | 56% | $\pm$5.5% | Marked one year since returning to office |
| December 2025 | ~440 | 35% | 55% | $\pm$5.6% | Early legislative battles over targeted agency funding |
| November 2025 | ~450 | 36% | 54% | $\pm$5.5% | Shifting sentiment on executive vs. personal use of office |
| October 2025 | ~460 | 38% | 52% | $\pm$5.5% | Mid-fall legislative agenda struggles |
| September 2025 | ~450 | 39% | 50% | $\pm$5.5% | Initial post-summer tracking baseline adjustments |
| August 2025 | ~440 | 40% | 49% | $\pm$5.6% | Steady tracking through late summer recess |
| July 2025 | ~450 | 41% | 48% | $\pm$5.5% | First six-month check-in marks |
| June 2025 | ~460 | 41% | 47% | $\pm$5.5% | Early second-term policy initiatives rolling out |
| May 2025 | ~450 | 42% | 46% | $\pm$5.5% | Initial budget proposals submitted to Congress |
| April 2025 | ~440 | 42% | 45% | $\pm$5.6% | Post-100 days mark; numbers hold steady |
| March 2025 | ~450 | 42% | 46% | $\pm$5.5% | Early policy momentum and cabinet confirmations |
| February 2025 | ~460 | 43% | 45% | $\pm$5.5% | First post-Inaugural addresses and executive orders |
| January 2025 | ~450 | 44% | 44% | $\pm$5.5% | Inauguration Baseline: Net-neutral starting split |
