So on my oh-dark-thirty drive to DC this morning, I did in fact listen to yesterday's argument on independent agency removal and Humphrey's Executor (and for the record, I did not fall asleep, as if I had, I would have probably killed myself on icy roads). A few observations...
1. As many articles have suggested, the nature of many of the questions did indeed suggest, in an indirect way, that Slaughter will not be coming back to the FTC. Much more about "how" rather than "whether" that result will apply.
2. Also as noted, it was not one of the better arguments I've listened to. As much as the justices routinely test the limits of the advocates' theories, many of their questions were so far down the road of reductio ad absurdem as to be unhelpful, and the advocates' responses to those questions weren't much better or helpful at identifying the outer limits or even conceding that they might exist. (IMO, Slaughter's attorney was somewhat better on this front.)
3. With that said, there were a few interesting angles and items....
a. There was surprising ambiguity regarding just when agencies exercise "executive" authority (arguably subject to presidential control under the President's "take care" grant in Article II). For example, rulemaking was called executive rather than legislative, lots of references to Article I courts (which IMO are otherwise easily dealt with by the constitution's grant of legislative authority to establish inferior courts), and Slaughter's counsel seemed to lean to the crazily narrow position that only the exercise of criminal enforcement powers constitutes executive action, even if a civil action authorized a fine of $100M (don't laugh, that's the statutory "civil" fine for not providing information during a drug price negotiation).
b. Some interesting remedial dialogue, ie, is the case necessarily about terminating the agency official, or could they instead simply invalidate the official's ability to undertake executive functions? (The latter would likely be too complicated for them to open the doors to)
c. Gorsuch (full disclosure, my favorite justice) very subtlely raised a really interesting issue around p. 46 of the transcript -- ie, if the concern with overruling Humphrey's is about concentrating too much power in the president, perhaps the "real solution" to that problem is put some teeth back into the nondelegation doctrine by requiring executive action to be consistent with choices that congress has made in the first instance (that is, don't allow such broad grants of authority). I've been saying for several years that this sort of thing "might" (IMO, hopefully) become the real legacy of the Roberts court.
d. Stare decisis got surprisingly short shrift, beyond Soto's broadsides about undercutting reliance on core government structures. Part of that may be that it's easy enough to distinguish given the difference in FTC powers at that time, as well as the erosion of Humphrey's reasoning in later cases.
4. I continue to really hate the way both Alito and Soto conduct themselves in arguments. They ask sloppy ham handed questions and when they don't get the answer they like, they just interrupt or cut off the advocate. Contrast that to both Kavenaugh and Kagan, who let the advocates have their say, tell them when there's something really important they want to hear about, and try to confirm their understanding of what the advocate is saying.